Working Paper: NBER ID: w3353
Authors: John M. Abowd; Henry S. Farber
Abstract: We develop and estimate a model of the union's optimal extent of \norganizing activity that accounts for the decision of employers regarding \nresistance to union organizing. The central exogenous variable in the \nanalysis is the quantity of quasi-rents per worker available to be split \nbetween unions and employers. \nWe measure available quasi-rents per worker as the difference per \nworker between total industry revenues net of raw materials costs and labor \ncosts evaluated at the opportunity cost of the workers. Using two-digit \nindustry level data for thirty-five U.S. industries for the period 1955 \nthrough 1986, we find that both organizing activity and employer resistance \nto unionization are positively related to available quasi-rents per worker. \nHowever, there is still a strong negative trend in union organizing activity \nand a strong positive trend in employer resistance after controlling for \nquasi-rents per worker. Thus, the explanation for the decline in union \norganizing activity and the increase in employer resistance to unionization \nsince the mid 1970's lies elsewhere.
Keywords: Union organizing; Employer resistance; Quasirents; Labor economics
JEL Codes: J51; J53; L13
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| available quasirents per worker (J69) | union organizing activity (J51) |
| available quasirents per worker (J69) | employer resistance (J79) |
| union organizing activity (J51) | employer resistance (J79) |
| quasirents (R33) | trends in union organizing activity (J51) |
| quasirents (R33) | trends in employer resistance (J79) |