Working Paper: NBER ID: w31612
Authors: Jonathan MV Davis; Kyle Greenberg; Damon Jones
Abstract: We present evidence from a randomized trial of the impact of matching workers to jobs using the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm. Our setting is the U.S. Army’s annual many-to-one marketplace that matches 10,000 officers to units. Officers and jobs are partitioned into over 100 distinct markets, our unit of randomization. Matching with DA reduced officers’ attrition in their first year in their new match by 16.7 percent, but we can rule out more than a 10 percent reduction in attrition by the end of their second year. Matching with DA had precise zero effects on performance evaluations and promotions. Although matching with DA increased truthful preference reporting by a statistically significant 10 percent, many officers matched by DA misreport their true preferences. We present new evidence suggesting that communication and coordination of preferences may limit the benefits of DA in matching markets where each side actively ranks the other.
Keywords: deferred acceptance; labor markets; randomized controlled trial
JEL Codes: D47; J01; M5
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| DA matching algorithm (C69) | attrition in the first year (D29) |
| DA matching algorithm (C69) | performance evaluations (M51) |
| DA matching algorithm (C69) | promotions (M51) |
| DA matching algorithm (C69) | truthful preference reporting (C52) |
| attrition in the first year (D29) | attrition by the end of the second year (J63) |