Working Paper: NBER ID: w29460
Authors: Amanda Y. Agan; Bo Cowgill; Laura K. Gee
Abstract: We study how salary disclosures affect employer demand using a field experiment featuring hundreds of recruiters and over 2,000 job applications. We randomize the presence of salary questions and the candidates’ disclosures. Employers make negative inferences about non-disclosing candidates, and view salary history as a stronger signal about competing options than worker quality. Disclosures by men (and other highly-paid candidates) yield higher salary offers, but are negative signals of value (net of salary), yielding fewer callbacks. Male wage premiums are regarded as a weaker signal of quality than other wage premiums (such as working at higher paying firms).
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: C90; J70; M50
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Higher salaries (men) (J31) | Higher salary offers (M52) |
| Higher salaries (men) (J31) | Fewer callbacks (Y60) |
| Silent candidates (D79) | Lower perceived hidden ability (D29) |
| Lower perceived hidden ability (D29) | Lower salary offers (J31) |
| Disclosed salary amounts (J31) | Higher employer willingness to pay (WTP) (J31) |
| Disclosed salary amounts (J31) | Higher beliefs about median competing offers (C70) |
| Disclosed salary amounts (J31) | Higher salary offers (M52) |