Regulatory Arbitrage in Teacher Hiring and Retention: Evidence from Massachusetts Charter Schools

Working Paper: NBER ID: w27607

Authors: Jesse M. Bruhn; Scott A. Imberman; Marcus A. Winters

Abstract: We study personnel flexibility in charter schools by exploring how teacher retention varies with teacher and school quality in Massachusetts. Charters are more likely to lose their highest and lowest value-added teachers. Low performers tend to exit public education, while high performers tend to switch to traditional public schools. To rationalize these findings, we propose a model in which educators with high fixed-costs use charter schools to explore teaching careers before obtaining licenses required for higher paying public sector jobs. The model suggests charter schools create positive externalities for traditional public schools by increasing the average quality of available teachers.

Keywords: charter schools; teacher retention; labor market flexibility

JEL Codes: I21; J45; M51


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
charter schools (I28)positive externalities for traditional public schools (H49)
charter schools (I28)average quality of available teachers (I21)
charter schools (I28)loss of highest value-added teachers (I21)
charter schools (I28)loss of lowest value-added teachers (J45)
licensure attainment (J44)probability of moving to traditional public schools (I24)
charter schools (I28)filtering mechanism for teacher labor market (J45)
low value-added teachers (A39)exit from education sector (I21)
high value-added teachers (A29)transition to traditional public schools (J45)

Back to index