Working Paper: NBER ID: w19939
Authors: Orley C. Ashenfelter; Daniel Hosken; Matthew C. Weinberg
Abstract: In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork viewed most mergers as either competitively neutral or efficiency enhancing. In his view, only mergers creating a dominant firm or monopoly were likely to harm consumers. Bork was especially skeptical of oligopoly concerns resulting from mergers. In this paper, we provide a critique of Bork's views on merger policy from The Antitrust Paradox. Many of Bork's recommendations have been implemented over time and have improved merger analysis. Bork's proposed horizontal merger policy, however, was too permissive. In particular, the empirical record shows that mergers in oligopolistic markets can raise consumer prices.
Keywords: mergers; antitrust; consumer prices; oligopoly; competition policy
JEL Codes: K21; L1; L4; L41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| mergers in oligopolistic markets (L13) | consumer prices (P22) |
| mergers (G34) | consumer prices (P22) |
| increased market concentration (L11) | reduced competition (L19) |
| reduced competition (L19) | consumer prices (P22) |