Working Paper: NBER ID: w9860
Authors: Michael D. Bordo; Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur
Abstract: We show that the size of the public debt, the budget deficit and the monetary overhang made it impossible for France to stabilize its price level and return to the pre-war parity immediately after World War I, even on the anti-keynesian assumption that a stabilization would not have had any negative effects on real income. The reason for the immediate postwar inflation then was not mismanaged policy but a wise choice in the French context. Nevertheless, a stabilization at a devalued franc which would have been substantially higher than the rate achieved by Poincar‚‚ in 1926 was historically possible in early 1924, and it would likely have benefited not only France but the entire international monetary system.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: E63; M4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| public debt, budget deficit, monetary overhang (E62) | inability to stabilize price level (E31) |
| earlier stabilization (C62) | benefits for France and international monetary system (F33) |
| British-style stabilization policy (E63) | higher debt-to-GDP ratio than Britain (H69) |
| British policy (F54) | short-term benefits in bond market credibility (G12) |
| earlier stabilization in 1924 (N13) | more sustainable due to inflation (E31) |