Working Paper: NBER ID: w9794
Authors: Herschel I. Grossman
Abstract: Some polities are able to use constitutionally prescribed political processes to settle distributional disputes, whereas in other polities distributional disputes result in civil conflict. Theoretical analysis reveals that the following properties help to make it possible to design a self-enforcing constitution that can settle recurring distributional disputes between social classes without civil conflict: *Neither social class has a big advantage in civil conflict. *The expected incremental costs of civil conflict are large relative to aggregate appropriable economic rents. *Both social classes are greatly concerned about the future consequences of their current actions. Theoretical analysis also reveals that a self-enforcing constitution can require limitations on the prerogatives of winners of constitutional contests such that on average the distribution of appropriable economic rents under the constitution is not too favorable to one social class or the other and such that the outcome of a constitutional contest does not matter too much for the current distribution of economic rents.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D74
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| expected incremental costs of civil conflict (c_l and c_w) (D74) | emergence of self-enforcing constitution (K10) |
| probability of civil conflict (q) (D74) | emergence of self-enforcing constitution (K10) |
| high expected costs of civil conflict relative to economic rents (D74) | avoidance of civil conflict (D74) |
| emergence of self-enforcing constitution (K10) | stabilization of distribution of economic rents (D39) |
| expected costs and probabilities associated with outcomes (D80) | design of constitutions (K10) |