Working Paper: NBER ID: w9775
Authors: Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes; Cristian Pop-Eleches; Andrei Shleifer
Abstract: In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek (1960) distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: K4; O10; P16; P17
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Judicial Independence (K16) | Economic Freedom (P19) |
| Judicial Independence (K16) | Political Freedom (P26) |
| Common Law Legal Origin (K15) | Economic Freedom (P19) |
| Constitutional Review (K10) | Political Freedom (P26) |
| Constitutional Review (K10) | Human Rights (K38) |