A Model of Addon Pricing

Working Paper: NBER ID: w9721

Authors: Glenn Ellison

Abstract: This paper examines a competitive model of add-on pricing, the practice of advertising low prices for one good in hopes of selling additional products (or a higher quality product) to consumers at a high price at the point of sale. The main conclusion is that add-on pricing softens price competition between firms and results in higher equilibrium profits.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: L13; M30


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
addon pricing (D44)softens price competition (D43)
softens price competition (D43)higher equilibrium profits (D53)
addon pricing (D44)higher equilibrium profits (D53)
adverse selection problem (D82)influences competition dynamics (L11)
addon pricing (D44)differentiated pricing outcomes for high and low types (D40)
differentiated pricing outcomes for high and low types (D40)impacts overall firm profits (L21)
presence of low types (C69)affects pricing strategies (L11)
pricing structure that mitigates competitive pressures (D40)preferred by firms (L20)

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