Working Paper: NBER ID: w9608
Authors: Simeon Djankov; Edward L. Glaeser; Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes; Andrei Shleifer
Abstract: In recent years, comparative economics experienced a revival, with a new focus on comparing capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. We argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. We then apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H1; K1; P1; P14; P16; P37; P5; P51
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| secure property rights (P14) | economic growth (O49) |
| effective institutions (O43) | economic performance (P17) |
| state power to control disorder (P26) | risk of dictatorship (D72) |
| colonial transplantation of institutions (F54) | inefficiency of institutions (O17) |
| institutional choices (D02) | ability to manage tradeoff (D91) |