Inflation Inertia and Credible Disinflation: The Open Economy Case

Working Paper: NBER ID: w9557

Authors: Guillermo Calvo; Oya Celasun; Michael Kumhof

Abstract: This paper develops a model of inflation inertia based on optimizing forward looking staggered price setting in a small open economy. Unlike in current models of sticky prices, transitions to a lower steady state inflation rate take time even if they are fully credible, and they are associated with significant output losses. There is a welfare trade-off between these output losses and the gains from smaller inflationary distortions. For reasonable parameter values inflation stabilization improves welfare. The optimal steady state is reached at the Friedman rule. Technical appendices are available at www.nber.org/data-appendix/w9557/ inert-techapp.pdf

Keywords: inflation inertia; disinflation; monetary policy; open economy

JEL Codes: E31; E52; F41


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
credible disinflation policies (E31)significant output losses (E23)
inflation inertia (E31)significant output losses (E23)
historical pricing decisions (L11)inflation inertia (E31)
behavior of new price setters (D41)inflation inertia (E31)
inflation inertia (E31)recession (E32)
initial pricing decisions (L11)inflation inertia (E31)
front-loading behavior of firms (D22)inflation inertia (E31)

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