Working Paper: NBER ID: w9469
Authors: William N. Goetzmann; Matthew Spiegel; Andrey Ukhov
Abstract: This paper examines governance explanations for the discount of preferred shares to common shares in the Russian market. conflicts between shareholder classes may help explain the discount. However, for this to be the sole explanation the estimated models suggest that the magnitude of future adverse shareholder events would have to be very high. Nevertheless, evidence of a common factor potentially related to governance seems evident in the date, implying that corporate control issues may at least be partially responsible for the observed preferred share discount
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: F3; G3
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| corporate governance (G38) | pricing of preferred shares (G12) |
| corporate governance (G38) | pricing of common shares (G12) |
| conflicts between shareholder classes (G34) | discount of preferred shares (G35) |
| corporate control issues (G34) | pricing of preferred shares (G12) |
| corporate control issues (G34) | pricing of common shares (G12) |
| governance perceptions (H11) | valuation of Russian securities (G12) |
| extreme investor priors about expropriation (H13) | valuation of Russian securities (G12) |