Working Paper: NBER ID: w9451
Authors: Hilary Sigman
Abstract: Under most U.S. environmental regulations, the federal government shares responsibility with the states by authorizing them to implement and enforce federal policies. Authorization provides states with considerable discretion over the effects of regulation and is perhaps the most significant decentralization in U.S. environmental policy. However, few studies address its role. To fill this gap, this paper explores the empirical determinants of authorization for water pollution and hazardous waste regulation. Although no single hypothesis strongly explains authorization, I find some evidence that states authorize to increase the stringency of regulation, which suggests that environmental decentralization would be beneficial.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: Q28; H77
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| state authorization (K29) | stringency of environmental regulations (Q52) |
| state authorization (K29) | regulatory outcomes (K20) |
| state authorization (K29) | effectiveness of environmental regulation (Q52) |
| state authorization (K29) | poor enforcement of environmental laws (F64) |
| state motivations (H77) | regulatory outcomes (K20) |