Working Paper: NBER ID: w9413
Authors: Brian A. Jacob; Steven D. Levitt
Abstract: We develop an algorithm for detecting teacher cheating that combines information on unexpected test score fluctuations and suspicious patterns of answers for students in a classroom. Using data from the Chicago Public Schools, we estimate that serious cases of teacher or administrator cheating on standardized tests occur in a minimum of 4-5 percent of elementary school classrooms annually. Moreover, the observed frequency of cheating appears to respond strongly to relatively minor changes in incentives. Our results highlight the fact that incentive systems, especially those with bright line rules, often induce behavioral distortions such as cheating. Statistical analysis, however, may provide a means of detecting illicit acts, despite the best attempts of perpetrators to keep them clandestine.
Keywords: teacher cheating; high-stakes testing; incentives; educational policy
JEL Codes: I20; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| teacher cheating (A19) | large test score fluctuations (C46) |
| teacher cheating (A19) | suspicious answer patterns (C38) |
| incentive structures for teachers (M52) | prevalence of cheating (K42) |
| increased stakes for test scores (D29) | higher instances of cheating (C70) |
| low-achieving students (I24) | prevalence of cheating (K42) |
| school policies and leadership changes (I28) | environment conducive to cheating (P37) |