Working Paper: NBER ID: w9114
Authors: Suzanne Scotchmer
Abstract: Intellectual property treaties have two main types of provisions: national treatment of foreign inventors, and harmonization of protections. I address the positive question of when countries would want to treat foreign inventors the same as domestic inventors, and how their incentive to do so depends on reciprocity. I also investigate an equilibrium in which regional policy makers choose IP policies that serve regional interests, conditional on each other's policies. I compare these policies with a notion of what is optimal, and argue that harmonization will involve stronger IP protection than independent choices. Harmonization can either enhance or reduce global welfare. Levels of public and private R&D spending will be lower than if each country took account of the uncompensated externalities that its R&D spending confers on other countries. The more extensive protection engendered by attempts at harmonization are a partial remedy.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: F1; L5
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Countries' decisions to engage in IP treaties (F13) | Reciprocity of treatment toward foreign inventors (O34) |
| Reciprocity of treatment toward foreign inventors (O34) | Incentive to provide national treatment (F23) |
| Harmonization of IP protections (O34) | Strength of IP rights (O34) |
| Strength of IP rights (O34) | R&D spending (O32) |
| Harmonization of IP protections (O34) | Global welfare (I31) |
| Absence of strong IP rights (O34) | R&D spending (O32) |