Working Paper: NBER ID: w9002
Authors: James J. Heckman; Carolyn Heinrich; Jeffrey Smith
Abstract: This paper examines the performance of the JTPA performance system, a widely emulated model for inducing efficiency in government organizations. We present a model of how performance incentives may distort bureaucratic decisions. We define cream skimming within the model. Two major empirical findings are (a) that the short run measures used to monitor performance are weakly, and sometimes perversely, related to long run impacts and (b) that the efficiency gains or losses from cream skimming are small. We find evidence that centers respond to performance standards.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: C31
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| performance standards (J80) | selection process within training centers (M53) |
| performance incentives under the JTPA system (J33) | bureaucratic decisions (D73) |
| short-run performance measures (L25) | long-run impacts (F69) |
| cream skimming (D49) | overall program effectiveness (C52) |