Working Paper: NBER ID: w8973
Authors: B. Douglas Bernheim; Antonio Rangel; Luis Rayo
Abstract: We examine democratic policy-making in a simple institution with real-time agenda setting. Individuals are recognized sequentially. Once recognized, an individual makes a proposal, which is immediately put to a vote. If a proposal passes, it supercedes all previously passed proposals. The policy that emerges from this process is implemented. For some familiar classes of policy spaces with rich distributional politics, we show that the last proposer is effectively a dictator under a variety of natural conditions. Most notably, this occurs whenever a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. Thus, under reasonably general assumptions, control of the final proposal with real-time agenda setting confers as much power as control of the entire agenda.
Keywords: democratic policymaking; agenda setting; political power; Pareto efficiency; collective choice
JEL Codes: D7; H0
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| last proposer (D44) | significant influence over policy outcomes (D72) |
| control over final proposal (G34) | control over entire agenda (D72) |
| last proposer (D44) | dictate outcomes (D72) |
| last proposer (D44) | disadvantages majority (D72) |
| control over final proposal (G34) | outcomes that disadvantage majority (J15) |
| last proposal's control (E61) | outcomes that disadvantage majority (J15) |