Working Paper: NBER ID: w8942
Authors: Edward L. Glaeser; Andrei Shleifer
Abstract: James Michael Curley, a four-time mayor of Boston, used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from Boston, thereby shaping the electorate in his favor. Boston as a consequence stagnated, but Curley kept winning elections. We present a model of the Curley effect, in which inefficient redistributive policies are sought not by interest groups protecting their rents, but by incumbent politicians trying to shape the electorate through emigration of their opponents or reinforcement of class identities. The model sheds light on ethnic politics in the United States and abroad, as well as on class politics in many countries including Britain.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D70; D72; H4
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| higher tax rates (q) (H29) | emigration of politically opposed groups (F22) |
| higher tax rates (q) (H29) | reshaping of the electorate (K16) |
| emigration of politically opposed groups (F22) | reinforcement of class or ethnic identities (F55) |
| higher tax rates (q) (H29) | negative economic outcome for the city (R11) |
| incumbent's choice of higher taxes (q) (H29) | emigration of wealthier constituents (F22) |