Working Paper: NBER ID: w8664
Authors: Canice Prendergast
Abstract: I offer theoretical and empirical observations on the oversight of public sector employees. I argue that it is unreasonable to expect that the solutions typically considered in the literature will be effective with public sector employees, because bureaucrats are especially difficult to monitor. To offset this weakness, agencies tend to hire bureaucrats who are biased against consumers, where such bias increases incentives. I then address how bureaucrats should be overseen and offer a choice between internal monitoring of public agencies, with overseers who are biased against consumers, or external monitoring, where bureaucrats become excessively worried about the prospect of an investigation and may change their behavior to attain that goal. I provide evidence from the Los Angeles Police Department to show that officers appear to have responded to increased oversight by reducing crime-fighting activities in an attempt to avoid investigation.
Keywords: public sector oversight; bureaucracy; Los Angeles Police Department; internal monitoring; external monitoring
JEL Codes: H8; L3; R5
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Increased external oversight (G38) | Reduction in proactive policing efforts (K42) |
| Increased external oversight (G38) | Change in police behavior (K42) |
| Prior to increased oversight (G38) | Officers engaged more in aggressive policing tactics (K42) |
| Post-oversight (G38) | Reluctance to engage in aggressive policing tactics (J45) |
| Fear of disciplinary measures associated with oversight (G28) | Change in police behavior (K42) |