Working Paper: NBER ID: w8638
Authors: Avner Barilan; Bruce Sacerdote
Abstract: We use traffic data from a series of experiments in the United States and Israel to examine how illegal behavior is deterred by various penalty schemes and whether deterrence varies with age, income, driving record and criminal record. We find that red light running decreases sharply in response to an increase in the fine or an increase in the probability of being caught. The elasticity of violations with respect to the fine is larger for younger drivers and drivers with older cars. Drivers convicted of violent offenses or property offenses run more red lights on average but have the same elasticity as drivers without a criminal record. Within Israel, members of ethnic minority groups have the smallest elasticity with respect to a fine increase.
Keywords: traffic violations; deterrence; penalty schemes; red light running
JEL Codes: J0; K0
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| younger drivers (R48) | larger elasticity with respect to fine increases (D11) |
| drivers with criminal records (R48) | same elasticity with respect to fine increases as those without criminal records (K14) |
| members of ethnic minority groups (J15) | smallest elasticity with respect to fine increases (D11) |
| increase in fines (K49) | decrease in red light running (R48) |
| increase in probability of being caught (K42) | decrease in red light running (R48) |