Working Paper: NBER ID: w8619
Authors: Laura L. Bivins; Kala Krishna
Abstract: This paper compares the effects of migration restrictions using licenses which are freely traded in a competitive labor market to those that occur when licenses are allocated to firms who are not permitted to trade them. There is reason to expect that a policy of making licenses non-transferable will not only affect production efficiency, but also to allow producers to capture more of the potential migration rents. Applications to migration policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are discussed.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: F22; F13; F16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Nontransferable licenses (D45) | inefficiencies in production (D24) |
| Nontransferable licenses (D45) | distorted labor allocation (J29) |
| distorted labor allocation (J29) | overall productivity (O49) |
| Nontransferable licenses (D45) | reduced share of migration rents for migrant workers (F16) |
| severely distorted allocation of licenses (D45) | skewed distribution of migration rents (D39) |
| imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign labor (F16) | distorted homogeneous labor outcomes (J79) |