Redistribution Through Education and Other Transfer Mechanisms

Working Paper: NBER ID: w8588

Authors: Eric Hanushek; Charles Ka Yui Leung; Kuzey Yilmaz

Abstract: Educational subsidies are frequently justified as a method of altering the income distribution. It is thus natural to compare education to other tax-transfer schemes designed to achieve distributional objectives. While equity-efficiency trade-offs are frequently discussed, they are rarely explicitly treated. This paper creates a general equilibrium model of school attendance, labor supply, wage determination, and aggregate production, which is used to compare alternative redistribution devices in terms of both deadweight loss and distributional outcomes. A wage subidy generally dominates tuition subsidies in ex ante (or 'opportunity') calculations, but this reverses in ex post (or 'realized') calculations. Both are generally superior to a negative income tax. With externalities in production, however, there is an unambiguous role for governmental subsidy of education, because it both raises GDP and creates a more equal income distribution.

Keywords: education; redistribution; economic output; subsidies

JEL Codes: D6; H2; I2


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
educational subsidies (I22)income distribution (D31)
educational investments (I26)national economy (O51)
educational subsidies (I22)societal welfare (I38)
wage subsidies (J38)aggregate utility (E10)
wage subsidies (J38)equity in ex ante distribution of utility (D63)
tuition subsidies (I22)equity in ex ante distribution of utility (D63)
educational subsidies (I22)GDP (E20)
government investment in education (H52)economic performance (P17)
educational subsidies (I22)equitable income distribution (D63)

Back to index