Working Paper: NBER ID: w8521
Authors: Simon Johnson; Todd Mitton
Abstract: The initial impact of the Asian financial crisis in Malaysia reduced the expected value of government subsidies to politically favored firms. Of the estimated $60 billion loss in market value for politically connected firms from July 1997 to August 1998, roughly 9% can be attributed to the fall in the value of their connections. Firing the Deputy Prime Minister and imposing capital controls in September 1998 primarily benefited firms with strong ties to Prime Minister Mahathir. Of the estimated $5 billion gain in market value for Mahathir-connected firms during September 1998, approximately 32% was due to the increase in the value of their connections. The evidence suggests Malaysian capital controls provided a screen behind which favored firms could be supported.
Keywords: capital controls; cronyism; Malaysia; Asian financial crisis
JEL Codes: E; G; O
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| capital controls (F38) | market value of politically connected firms (G34) |
| political connections (D72) | market value of politically connected firms (G34) |
| Asian financial crisis (F65) | market value of politically connected firms (G34) |
| Asian financial crisis (F65) | political connections (D72) |