Working Paper: NBER ID: w7680
Authors: Casey B. Mulligan
Abstract: It has long been suggested that trade unions take actions and favor public policies that reduce the quantity of labor so that union members might enjoy greater labor incomes. Can this explain the prevalence of generous public pension programs inducing retirement? I suggest not, by formalizing the monopoly unionism model and showing how labor's interest in reducing the quantity of labor cannot explain why the old are induced to retire rather than discouraging work among workers of all ages. Discouraging work of a subset of union workers introduces allocative inefficiencies without promoting the objectives of the monopoly union. And, unless the old have a disproportionate influence within the union, union interests cannot explain why public pension programs are so generous.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: J26; J51; D78; H55
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| public pension programs (H55) | quantity of labor supplied by older workers (J26) |
| design of pension benefits (H55) | disincentive for older workers to remain in the labor force (J26) |
| public pension policies (H55) | labor supply decisions of older workers (J26) |