Working Paper: NBER ID: w7296
Authors: Theodore Eisenberg; Henry S. Farber
Abstract: We develop a model of the plaintiff's decision to file a law suit that has implications for how differences between the federal government and private litigants and litigation translate into differences in trial rates and plaintiff win rates at trial. Our case selection model generates a set of predictions for relative trial rates and plaintiff win rates depending on the type of case and whether the government is defendant or plaintiff. In order to test the model, we use data on about 350,000 cases filed in federal district court between 1979 and 1997 in the areas of personal injury and job discrimination where the federal government and private parties work under roughly similar legal rules. We find broad support for the predictions of the model.
Keywords: litigation; case selection model; government as litigant; trial rates; plaintiff win rates
JEL Codes: K41
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
Cause | Effect |
---|---|
Government defendant (L49) | Higher trial rate (K41) |
Government defendant (L49) | Higher plaintiff win rate (K41) |
Job discrimination cases (government plaintiff) (J71) | Lower trial rate (K49) |
Job discrimination cases (government plaintiff) (J71) | Higher plaintiff win rate (K41) |
Defendant costs (K41) | Lower trial rate (K49) |
Defendant liability probability (K13) | Higher plaintiff win rate (K41) |
Plaintiff costs (K41) | Higher plaintiff win rate (K41) |
Defendant costs (K41) | Lower plaintiff win rate (K41) |
Stakes of the case (K41) | Lower plaintiff win rate (K41) |