Working Paper: NBER ID: w7244
Authors: Roger H. Gordon; John D. Wilson
Abstract: Changes in tax policy can affect all aspects of the economy. Not only do firms and individuals change behavior, creating efficiency costs, but government expenditure choices can also change. Unless these expenditure choices had been optimal' previously, changes in response to a tax reform affect welfare and should be taken into account when designing tax policy. This paper develops a specific model of government behavior and then explores the implications of government, as well as private, behavioral responses for tax policy. In particular, we assume that government officials favor expenditure (or regulatory) choices that increase the government's budget. As a result, higher tax rates on a particular activity encourage government behavior that aids the growth of this activity. This response enables tax policy to redirect government activity in desirable directions, but it also makes Pigovian taxes on negative externalities less effective.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: H21; D78
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Changes in tax rates (H29) | Government officials' expenditure choices (H59) |
| Government officials' expenditure choices (H59) | Overall economic welfare (D69) |
| Higher tax rates on specific activities (H29) | Government officials' support for policies that foster those activities (O25) |
| Government officials' support for policies that foster those activities (O25) | Feedback loop where tax structures impact government decision-making (H19) |
| Tax policy changes (H29) | Government behavior (H11) |