Working Paper: NBER ID: w7054
Authors: Gordon H. Hanson; Raymond Robertson; Antonio Spilimbergo
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the impact of government enforcement of the U.S.-Mexican border on wages in the border regions of the United States and Mexico. The U.S. Border Patrol polices U.S. boundaries, seeking to apprehend any individual attempting to enter the United States illegally. These efforts are concentrated on the Mexican border, as most illegal immigrants embark from a Mexican border city and choose a U.S. border state as their final destination. We examine labor markets in southern California, southwestern Texas, and Mexican cities on the U.S.-Mexico border. For each region, we have high-frequency time-series data on wages and on the number of person hours that the U.S. Border Patrol spends policing border areas. For a range of empirical specifications and definitions of regional labor markets, we find little impact of border enforcement on wages in U.S. border cities and a moderate negative impact of border enforcement on wages in Mexican border cities. These findings are consistent with two hypothesis: (1) border enforcement has a minimal impact on illegal immigration, or (2) immigration from Mexico has a minimal impact on wages in U.S. border cities.
Keywords: border enforcement; illegal immigration; labor markets; wages
JEL Codes: D20; F10
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Increased border enforcement (F55) | Little impact on wages in US border cities (F66) |
| Increased border enforcement hours (K37) | Wage changes do not significantly rise in US border cities (F66) |
| Increased border enforcement (F55) | Moderate negative impact on wages in Mexican border cities (F66) |
| Increased border enforcement (F55) | Affect local wage dynamics in Mexican border cities (F66) |
| Illegal immigration (K37) | Wage levels in US border markets (F16) |