Working Paper: NBER ID: w6452
Authors: Jon Faust; Lars E. O. Svensson
Abstract: We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in the sense that it induces higher inflation, but a less expansionary policy in the sense that it induces lower inflation and employment than expected. Increased transparency makes the bank's reputation and credibility more sensitive to its actions. This has a moderating influence on the bank's policy. Full transparency of the central bank's intentions is generally socially beneficial, but frequently not in the interest of the bank. Somewhat paradoxically, direct observability of idiosyncratic central bank goals removes the moderating incentive on the bank and leads to the worst equilibrium.
Keywords: transparency; credibility; monetary policy
JEL Codes: E52; E58
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Low-credibility central bank (E58) | Higher inflation outcomes (E31) |
| Low-credibility central bank (E58) | Lower employment than expected (J23) |
| Increased transparency (G38) | Heightened sensitivity of bank's reputation to its actions (G21) |
| Increased transparency (G38) | Moderated policy decisions (E60) |
| Full transparency (G38) | Worse equilibrium outcomes (D59) |