Working Paper: NBER ID: w4282
Authors: Robert E. Baldwin; Jeffrey W. Steagall
Abstract: This paper attempts to determine the economic factors that best explain the decisions of the International Trade Commission in antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases, utilizing the economic data collected by the Commission for each investigation. We also consider the extent to which these factors measure the injury conditions and causation relationships specified in U.S. trade laws. Our analyses yield mixed results. For example, while the Commission tends to require declining profits and employment in an industry before recommending import protection in safeguard cases -- as specified in the law, it is not clear that it delineates between serious injury caused by increased imports and serious injury due to other factors. Similarly, in countervailing duty and antidumping cases, economic conditions, such as changes in industry shipments and the degree of capacity utilization, are taken into consideration in material injury decisions, but other factors one would expect to be associated with affirmative decisions, e.g., the ratio of unfair imports to consumption, do not seem to playa significant role. Some variables also enter significantly in the regressions that do not seem to be indicators of material injury.
Keywords: ITC decisions; antidumping; countervailing duty; safeguard laws
JEL Codes: F13; F14
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
Cause | Effect |
---|---|
declining profits (E11) | ITC affirmative decisions (L49) |
declining employment (J63) | ITC affirmative decisions (L49) |
economic conditions (E66) | ITC affirmative decisions (L49) |
changes in industry shipments (L69) | material injury decisions (K13) |
capacity utilization (E23) | material injury decisions (K13) |
ratio of unfair imports to consumption (F14) | ITC affirmative decisions (L49) |
serious injury due to increased imports (F69) | serious injury due to other factors (J28) |