Working Paper: NBER ID: w31994
Authors: Emma Duchini; Victor Lavy; Stephen Machin; Shqiponja Telhaj
Abstract: Low-performing, high-poverty, public schools notoriously struggle to attract and retain good teachers. This paper studies a setting where independent organizations, including charities and businesses, take over the management of under-performing schools, while funding remains public. Exploiting the staggered expansion of English Sponsor-led academies since the early 2000s, we show that the Sponsor-led takeover leads to substantial changes in the teaching body and the school personnel policy. The probability that the Sponsor appoints a new headteacher doubles upon the takeover, with the new headteacher being, on average, better paid, and more likely to come from outstanding schools. The takeover also induces teacher sorting, with older and lower-achieving teachers leaving the school, and new teachers joining the Sponsor-led school from outstanding schools. Lastly, Sponsors substantially restructure teachers’ rewarding scheme and abandon a pay scale entirely based on seniority, leading to a 10 percent increase in pay dispersion across equally experienced teachers.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: I28; J13; J18
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Sponsor-led takeover (G34) | Appointment of a new headteacher (M51) |
| Appointment of a new headteacher (M51) | Compensation of new headteachers (M52) |
| Sponsor-led takeover (G34) | Sorting effect among teachers (C92) |
| Sorting effect among teachers (C92) | Share of newly hired teachers (J45) |
| Sponsor-led takeover (G34) | Pay scheme restructuring (J33) |
| Sponsor-led takeover (G34) | Improvement in school performance (Ofsted ratings) (I21) |