Working Paper: NBER ID: w31985
Authors: Aaron Chalfin; Felipe M. Goncalves
Abstract: We study how public sector workers balance their professional motivations with private economic concerns, focusing on police arrests. Arrests made near the end of an officer's shift typically require overtime work, and officers respond by reducing arrest frequency but increasing arrest quality. Days in which an officer works a second job after their police shift have higher opportunity cost, also reducing late-shift arrests. Combining our estimates in a dynamic model identifies officer preferences over workplace activity and overtime work. Our results indicate that officers' private costs of arrests have a first-order impact on the quantity and quality of enforcement.
Keywords: public sector; policing; professional motivations; overtime; arrest quality
JEL Codes: J33; J45; K42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Officer motivations (J45) | Frequency of arrests (K42) |
| End of shifts (J63) | Frequency of arrests (K42) |
| Overtime work (J33) | Frequency of arrests (K42) |
| End of shifts (J63) | Quality of arrests (K40) |
| Presence of off-duty job (J63) | Late-shift arrests (P37) |
| Longer off-duty shifts (J22) | Late-shift arrests (P37) |
| Non-monetary costs of overtime work (J33) | Arrest behavior (K40) |
| Overtime pay (J33) | Policing practices (K42) |