Working Paper: NBER ID: w31681
Authors: Daron Acemoglu; Alexander Wolitzky
Abstract: Building on theories of international relations, we analyze how mistrust (uncertainty about an adversary's preferences or capabilities), misperception (imperfect observation of an adversary's actions), and misunderstanding (non-degenerate higher-order beliefs) can lead to conflict and drive its dynamics. We develop our analysis in the context of three classic models: a one-shot security dilemma or spiral model; a repeated version of the security dilemma that allows for gradual learning about the opponent's type, as well as the possibility of conflict spirals, traps, and cycles; and a deterrence model. We relate these models to the empirical literature and to current and historical episodes of conflict.
Keywords: mistrust; misperception; understanding; conflict dynamics; imperfect information
JEL Codes: C73; D74; P00
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Mistrust (D80) | Conflict (D74) |
| Misperception (D83) | Conflict (D74) |
| Misunderstanding (Y60) | Conflict (D74) |
| Mistrust (D80) | Preemptive Actions (D74) |
| Preemptive Actions (D74) | Conflict (D74) |
| Misperception (D83) | Escalation (D74) |
| Misunderstanding (Y60) | Misaligned Expectations (D84) |
| Misaligned Expectations (D84) | Conflict (D74) |
| Mistrust (D80) | Conflict Spirals (D74) |
| Misperception (D83) | Conflict Spirals (D74) |
| Misunderstanding (Y60) | Conflict Spirals (D74) |