Working Paper: NBER ID: w31676
Authors: Martin Beraja; Andrew Kao; David Y. Yang; Noam Yuchtman
Abstract: We document three facts about the global diffusion of surveillance AI technology, and in particular, the role played by China. First, China has a comparative advantage in this technology. It is substantially more likely to export surveillance AI than other countries, and particularly so as compared to other frontier technologies. Second, autocracies and weak democracies are more likely to import surveillance AI from China. This bias is not observed in AI imports from the US or in imports of other frontier technologies from China. Third, autocracies and weak democracies are especially more likely to import China’s surveillance AI in years of domestic unrest. Such imports coincide with declines in domestic institutional quality more broadly. To the extent that China may be exporting its surveillance state via trade in AI, this can enhance and beget more autocracies abroad. This possibility challenges the view that economic integration is necessarily associated with the diffusion of liberal institutions.
Keywords: surveillance; AI technology; China; trade; autocracies; democracies
JEL Codes: E0; L5; L81; O3; P0
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| China's comparative advantage in surveillance AI (L63) | higher exports to autocracies and weak democracies (F10) |
| domestic demand for surveillance (R22) | China's comparative advantage in surveillance AI (L63) |
| regime type (P16) | likelihood of importing China's surveillance AI (F17) |
| domestic unrest (D74) | importation of surveillance technology by autocracies and weak democracies (O17) |
| increased surveillance technology (K24) | entrenchment of autocratic governance (O17) |