Corporate Social Responsibility and Voting over Public Goods

Working Paper: NBER ID: w31633

Authors: Andrew A. Samwick; Sophie Wang

Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the total provision of public goods in a framework in which consumers who may make such voluntary contributions to public goods via CSR are also voters who decide on the level of taxes to finance publicly provided public goods. The main result indicates that, relative to an economy in which all public goods are publicly financed, the introduction of CSR lowers the total amount of public goods, as voters rationally anticipate that higher CSR will partially offset the consequences of lower public funding. The results offer a cautionary tale about the promotion of CSR in an economy with heterogeneous preferences for the public good.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Public Goods; Voting; Tax Financing

JEL Codes: D72; H41; M14


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (M14)total amount of public goods (H40)

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