Working Paper: NBER ID: w31545
Authors: Peter Q. Blair; Elijah Neilson
Abstract: In theory, unilateral divorce laws alter the private incentive to invest in human capital by permitting either spouse to initiate the division of the marital assets. Using several causal research designs we show that both men and women are less likely to attain a bachelor’s degree in states with unilateral divorce laws—especially individuals who were exposed to the laws when making educational choices and who live in states requiring an even split of assets upon divorce. Unilateral divorce laws do not distort human capital investment generically—but rather in contexts where the property division laws invite moral hazard.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D13; J12; J13; J24; K11; K12; K36
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| unilateral divorce laws (K36) | likelihood of obtaining a bachelor's degree (D29) |
| community property division laws (K36) | educational attainment (I21) |
| unilateral divorce laws (K36) | educational choices (I21) |
| unilateral divorce laws + community property division laws (K36) | human capital investment (J24) |
| unilateral divorce laws (K36) | educational attainment (I21) |
| unilateral divorce laws (K36) | human capital investment (J24) |