Working Paper: NBER ID: w31510
Authors: Marina Agranov; Ran Eilat; Konstantin Sonin
Abstract: We analyze a model of political competition in which the elite forms endogenously to aggregate information and advise the uninformed median voter which candidate to choose. The median voter knows whether or not the endorsed candidate is biased toward the elites, but might still prefer the biased candidate if the elite’s endorsement provides sufficient information about her competence. The elite size and the degree of information aggregation by the elite depend on the extent to which the median voter follows the elite’s advice. A higher cost of redistribution minimizes the elite’s information advantage, hinders information transmission, and decreases the expected competence of the elected politician.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D72; D83
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| elite forms endogenously (B52) | information aggregation (D83) |
| information aggregation (D83) | commons' voting behavior (D72) |
| elite's endorsement (D79) | commons' voting behavior (D72) |
| cost of redistribution (H23) | willingness of commons to follow elite advice (D72) |
| willingness of commons to follow elite advice (D72) | information transmission (L96) |
| elites' endorsement disregarded (D79) | inefficient outcomes in resource allocation (D61) |
| cost of redistribution (H23) | trust in elites' endorsement (D79) |