Working Paper: NBER ID: w31501
Authors: Leopoldo Fergusson; Javier Mejia; James A. Robinson; Santiago Torres
Abstract: We propose a framework to explain why some societies may end up with different constitutional solutions to the problem of maintaining order in the face of self-interested behavior. Though the salient intellectual tradition since Hobbes has focused on how institutional design is used to eradicate violence, our framework illustrates that equilibrium constitutions may in fact have to deliberately allow for violence. This arises because some societies are unable to use institutions to influence income distribution. In this case, a constitutional tolerance of violence emerges as a credible way for an incumbent to meet the participation constraint of a challenger. We illustrate the results with the comparative constitutional history of the US and Colombia.
Keywords: Constitutional Design; Political Order; Violence; Colombia; United States
JEL Codes: D70; D74; K10; P00
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| constitutional design (K10) | societal order (P16) |
| weak institutions (O17) | constitutional design allows violence (P37) |
| political uncertainty and expected inequality (D89) | low cost of rebellion (D74) |
| constitutional design (K10) | likelihood of rebellion (D74) |
| Colombian constitutional design (K10) | culture of rebellion (D74) |