Working Paper: NBER ID: w31474
Authors: Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin
Abstract: One frequently overlooked aspect of the U.S.-style electoral college system is that it discourages election fraud. In a presidential election based on the popular vote, competing political parties are motivated to manipulate votes in areas where they hold the most significant influence, such as states where they control local executive offices, legislatures, and the judiciary. However, with the electoral college system in place, the incentives for fraud shift to swing states where the local government is politically divided, and fraud is therefore more difficult and costly. Our theoretical model elucidates why the electoral college system provides more effective protection against election fraud compared to the popular vote system. While polarization makes fraud more likely, it does not affect the superiority of the electoral college system.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D73; D78; H83; P16
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| electoral system (K16) | likelihood of election fraud (K16) |
| electoral college system (D72) | likelihood of election fraud (K16) |
| swing states (K16) | likelihood of election fraud (K16) |
| political opposition (D72) | likelihood of election fraud (K16) |
| one party dominance (D72) | likelihood of election fraud (K16) |
| electoral college system (D72) | fraud as viable strategy (Z13) |