Working Paper: NBER ID: w31438
Authors: Pablo D. Fajgelbaum; Cecile Gaubert; Nicole Gorton; Eduardo Morales; Edouard Schaal
Abstract: We study how political preferences shaped California’s High-Speed Rail (CHSR), a large transportation project approved by referendum in 2008. Across census tracts, support for the project responded significantly to the projected economic gains at the time of voting, as measured by a quantitative model of high-speed rail matched to CHSR plans. We estimate that 0.1%- 0.2% projected economic gains swayed 1% of votes at the median tract. Given this elasticity, a revealed-preference approach comparing the CHSR with counterfactual designs identifies strong policymakers’ preferences for political support. A politically-blind planner would have placed the stations nearer to California’s dense metro areas, doubling the projected economic gains.
Keywords: Political Preferences; Transportation Policy; High-Speed Rail; California
JEL Codes: D72; O18; R10; R42
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| political preferences (D72) | spatial distribution of CHSR stations (C49) |
| expected real income benefits from CHSR (R42) | voters' preferences (D72) |
| political preferences (D72) | voters' preferences (D72) |
| CHSR approval (R48) | net income losses (G33) |
| extra real income gain (E25) | voter support for CHSR (K16) |
| politically blind planner (D72) | station placement closer to metro areas (R53) |
| political preferences (D72) | design of CHSR (R42) |
| political preferences (D72) | welfare effects of CHSR (D69) |