Working Paper: NBER ID: w31343
Authors: Johann Caroburnett; Sebastian Galiani; Gustavo Torrens
Abstract: In International Relations the canonical model of inter-estate interactions is a one-shot security competition game. The model has the structure of a prisoners dilemma, which results in an equilibrium with two sources of inefficiency: excessive arming and possibly the destruction associated with open conflict. Standard arguments in game theory suggest that more cooperative outcomes should emerge given that states often engage in repeated interactions. Historical record, on the contrary, shows cycles of peace, arms races, and serious instances of open conflict. Long-lasting disarmed peace is rarely observed. The paper develops a unified model of conflict that reveals possible theoretical mechanisms to produce such historical outcomes.
Keywords: conflict; security competition; folk theorem; stochastic games
JEL Codes: F5
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| The structure of the game (prisoners' dilemma) (C72) | armed peace (D74) |
| The structure of the game (prisoners' dilemma) (C72) | open conflict (D74) |
| Repeated interactions among states (C73) | disarmed peace (H56) |
| Patience among countries (F51) | sustainability of disarmed peace (F51) |
| Introduction of stochastic resources (C69) | likelihood of conflict (D74) |
| Wipeout opportunities (F65) | sustainability of disarmed peace (F51) |
| Wipeout opportunities (F65) | cycles of conflict and peace (D74) |