School Choice Competition and Aggregate School Quality

Working Paper: NBER ID: w31328

Authors: Michael Gilraine; Uros Petronijevic; John D. Singleton

Abstract: This paper develops and estimates an empirical framework that evaluates the impact of charter school choice on education quality in the aggregate. We estimate the model using student-level data from North Carolina. We find that North Carolina’s lifting of its statewide charter school cap raised the average public school's value-added by around 0.01 standard deviations (on the student test score distribution). We calculate the total human capital returns of the expansion at above $100,000 per charter school enrollee. We further show that competition drives the aggregate gains; test score impacts on students induced into charter schools by the policy are negative.

Keywords: charter schools; school choice; education quality; competition

JEL Codes: H75; I21; I28


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Competition among schools (I21)Aggregate gains in public school quality (I24)
Students induced into charter schools by the policy (I21)Negative test score impacts (C52)
Charter school expansion (I28)Total human capital returns of over $100,000 per charter school enrollee (I26)
Public schools near new charter schools (I28)Increase in quality (L15)
Focus on quality in screening charter school entrants (I21)Different educational outcomes (I21)
Lifting the charter school cap in North Carolina (I28)Average public school's value-added (I21)

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