Working Paper: NBER ID: w31283
Authors: Samuel Bazzi; Claudio Labanca
Abstract: This paper explores the labor market returns to working for a victorious political campaign. Using unique administrative data from Brazil, we track the earnings and employment of campaign workers before and after close elections spanning nearly 20 years. We identify sizable returns to working for a winning campaign, especially in areas with a large informal sector and for workers connected to newly elected challengers. The returns are concentrated in the public sector, where connected hires are relatively more qualified. Our results suggest that campaign connections facilitate the hiring of capable but inexperienced workers in the public sector through relational contracting.
Keywords: political campaigns; labor market returns; Brazil; campaign workers; public sector employment
JEL Codes: D72; D73; J45; J46; O17; P00
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Campaign connections (D79) | Pathways to public administration (H83) |
| Employment on a winning campaign (J68) | Labor market returns (J29) |
| Employment on a winning campaign (J68) | Increased hours worked (J22) |
| Employment on a winning campaign (J68) | Higher hourly wages (J31) |
| Depth of connection to the campaign (D79) | Labor market returns (J29) |
| Employment on a winning campaign (J68) | Access to public sector jobs (J45) |