Working Paper: NBER ID: w31169
Authors: Marco Battaglini; Valerio Leone Sciabolazza; Eleonora Patacchini
Abstract: We study vote trading among U.S. Congress members. By tracking roll-call votes within bills across five legislatures and politicians' personal connections made during the school years, we document a propensity of connected legislators to vote together that depends on how salient the bill is to the politicians' legislative agenda. Although this activity does not seem to enhance U.S. Congress members' legislative effectiveness, vote trading is a strong predictor of future promotions to position of leadership.
Keywords: vote trading; logrolling; legislative effectiveness; Congress; alumni connections
JEL Codes: D72; D74; D91
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| logrolling activities (D72) | chances of career advancement for legislators (J62) |
| alumni connections (Y80) | legislators' voting behavior (D72) |
| majority of alumni connections vote together (D79) | legislators' voting behavior (D72) |
| relevance of the bill to political agenda (D72) | propensity to conform to alumni voting behavior (D79) |