Empirical Analyses of Selection and Welfare in Insurance Markets: A Self-Indulgent Survey

Working Paper: NBER ID: w31146

Authors: Liran Einav; Amy Finkelstein

Abstract: This review article, which was solicited by the Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, surveys work that has been done using an empirical framework for analyzing selection in insurance markets developed by Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010). We briefly review that framework, and then describe a number of empirical applications that researchers have undertaken across an array of settings in both insurance and credit markets. We also discuss some of the useful extensions to the original framework that others have made and applied. The review is intended to be useful for scholars who may want to apply the framework in their own work on insurance, credit, or other selection markets.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: D60; D82


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Adverse selection (D82)Welfare losses (D69)
Welfare losses (D69)Higher prices (D49)
Welfare losses (D69)Lower quantities (C29)
Public policy interventions (J18)Mitigate welfare losses (D69)
Public policy interventions (J18)Alter pricing dynamics (D49)
Interventions (O31)Improved welfare outcomes (I39)

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