Working Paper: NBER ID: w30930
Authors: Carolina Kansikas; Anandi Mani; Paul Niehaus
Abstract: We examine the preferences of low-income households in Kenya over the structure of unconditional cash transfers. We find, first, that most prefer lumpier transfers, and many prefer delayed receipt—unlike the structures typical of safety-net programs, but consistent with evidence on the financial challenges of poverty. Second, poverty itself affects preferences: a little more financial slack when deciding increases desired delay. Finally, financial slack pays back: some delay—aligning transfers better with the seasonal cycle—increases deliberation, income, and goal progress 1.5 years later. Adapting cash transfer design to recipients’ decision-making environment could improve their financial choices and outcomes.
Keywords: No keywords provided
JEL Codes: D91; H53; I38; O2
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| preferences for timing of cash transfers (D15) | decision-making under poverty (D87) |
| cognitive ability (G53) | preference for delay in receiving transfers (D15) |
| timing of token transfers (F16) | preference for delay (D15) |
| waiting longer for transfers (F16) | longer-term benefits (J32) |
| cash flow (E50) | decision-making under poverty (D87) |
| cash on hand (E41) | preferences for timing of cash transfers (D15) |
| timing of initial token transfers (F16) | cash on hand (E41) |