Working Paper: NBER ID: w30916
Authors: A. Arda Gitmez; James A. Robinson; Mehdi Shadmehr
Abstract: Institutional constraints to counter potential abuses in the use of political power have been viewed as essential to well functioning political institutions and good public policy outcomes in the Western World since the time of ancient Greece. A sophisticated intellectual tradition emerged to justify the need for such constraints. In this paper we identify a new puzzle: such an intellectual tradition did not exist in the Islamic world, even if the potential for abuse was recognized. We develop a model to explain why such ideas might not have emerged. We argue that this is due to the nature of Islamic law (the Sharia) being far more encompassing than Western law, making it easier for citizens to identify abuses of power and use collective action to discipline them. We study how the relative homogeneity and solidarity of Islamic society fortified this logic.
Keywords: Islamic law; institutional constraints; political power; collective action
JEL Codes: D70; D72; D78; H11
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| scope of Islamic law (P40) | transparency of rulers' actions (D73) |
| transparency of rulers' actions (D73) | citizens' willingness to engage in collective action (D70) |
| societal homogeneity (Z13) | collective action efficacy against rulers (D70) |
| scope of Islamic law (P40) | perceived necessity for institutional constraints (D72) |