Working Paper: NBER ID: w30816
Authors: Oliver Browne; Ludovica Gazze; Michael Greenstone; Olga Rostapshova
Abstract: New technologies allow perfect detection of environmental violations at near-zero marginal cost, but take-up is low. We conducted a field experiment to evaluate enforcement of water conservation rules with smart meters in Fresno, CA. Households were randomly assigned combinations of enforcement method (automated or in-person inspections) and fines. Automated enforcement increased households’ punishment rates from 0.1 to 14%, decreased summer water use by 3%, and reduced violations by 17%, while higher fine levels had little effect. However, automated enforcement also increased customer complaints by 1,102%, ultimately causing its cancellation and highlighting that political considerations limit technological solutions to enforcement challenges.
Keywords: Automated Enforcement; Water Conservation; Field Experiment; Political Backlash
JEL Codes: K42; Q25
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| increased punishment rates (K42) | decreased summer water use (Q25) |
| automated enforcement (R48) | increased customer complaints (L15) |
| automated enforcement (R48) | increased punishment rates (K42) |
| automated enforcement (R48) | decreased summer water use (Q25) |