Making the Letter Grade: The Incentive Effects of Mandatory Pass/Fail Courses

Working Paper: NBER ID: w30798

Authors: Kristin Butcher; Patrick McEwan; Akila Weerapana

Abstract: In Fall 2014, Wellesley College began mandating pass/fail grading for courses taken by first-year, first-semester students, although instructors continued to record letter grades. We identify the causal effect of the policy on course choice and performance, using a regression-discontinuity-in-time design. Students shifted to lower-grading STEM courses in the first semester, but did not increase their engagement with STEM in later semesters. Letter grades of first-semester students declined by 0.13 grade points, or 23% of a standard deviation. We evaluate causal channels of the grade effect—including sorting into lower-grading STEM courses and declining instructional quality—and conclude that the effect is consistent with declining student effort.

Keywords: No keywords provided

JEL Codes: I23


Causal Claims Network Graph

Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.


Causal Claims

CauseEffect
Mandatory pass/fail grading policy (Z28)Reduced student effort (D29)
Decline in average letter grades (I21)Lower instructional quality or increased class sizes (I24)
Shift in course selection (A22)Decline in average letter grades (I21)
Mandatory pass/fail grading policy (Z28)Shift in course selection (A22)
Mandatory pass/fail grading policy (Z28)Decline in average letter grades (I21)

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