Working Paper: NBER ID: w30656
Authors: Matias Iaryczower; Santiago Oliveros; Parth Parihar
Abstract: We study the ability of multi-group teams to undertake binary projects in a decentralized environment. The equilibrium outcomes of our model display familiar features in collaborative settings, including inefficient gradualism, inaction, and contribution cycles, wherein groups alternate taking responsibility for moving the project forward. Expected delay grows more than proportionally with project size, and some welfare-enhancing projects are not completed, even as agents become arbitrarily patient. A team composed of two equally large groups can complete larger projects than a fully homogenous team, even as the difference in preferences for completion among the two groups is arbitrarily small. Moreover, if the project is sufficiently large, the two-group team always completes the project strictly faster.
Keywords: multigroup teams; decentralized environments; binary projects; collaboration; public goods
JEL Codes: C72; D72
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| group composition (C92) | project completion rates (H43) |
| two-group team (C92) | project completion speed (H43) |
| project size (O22) | expected delay in project completion (H43) |
| ingroup free riding (H40) | gradualism (O40) |
| outgroup free riding (H40) | inaction (Y70) |
| ingroup free riding + outgroup free riding (H40) | project delays (H43) |
| juniors finishing projects + seniors contributing less (D29) | project timelines (Y10) |
| contribution cycles (D64) | project outcomes (O22) |