Working Paper: NBER ID: w30621
Authors: Alain de Janvry; Guojun He; Elisabeth Sadoulet; Shaoda Wang; Qiong Zhang
Abstract: Subjective performance evaluation is widely used by firms and governments to provide work incentives. However, delegating evaluation power to local leadership could induce influence activities: employees might devote too much effort to impressing/pleasing their evaluator, relative to working toward the goals of the organization itself. We conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment among Chinese local civil servants to study the existence and implications of influence activities. We find that civil servants do engage in evaluator-specific influence to affect evaluation outcomes, partly in the form of reallocating work efforts toward job tasks that are more important and observable to the evaluator. Importantly, we show that introducing uncertainty about the evaluator’s identity discourages evaluator-specific influence activities and improves bureaucratic work performance.
Keywords: Subjective performance evaluation; Influence activities; Bureaucratic work behavior; Field experiment; China
JEL Codes: D73; M12
Edges that are evidenced by causal inference methods are in orange, and the rest are in light blue.
| Cause | Effect |
|---|---|
| Evaluator's identity (A11) | Evaluator-specific influence activities (C52) |
| Evaluator-specific influence activities (C52) | Positive assessments of performance by evaluating supervisor (M51) |
| Masked scheme (C70) | Focus on productive tasks valued by both supervisors (J24) |
| Masked scheme (C70) | Improved bureaucratic work performance metrics (D73) |
| Introduction of uncertainty regarding evaluator's identity (D89) | Discouragement of evaluator-specific influence activities (C90) |